

8 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM: Robert M. Gates
Executive Assistant

SUBJECT: DCI Goals for Remainder of 1980

As you get ready to leave town for California, there may not be an opportunity for us to discuss your attached list of goals. Therefore, let me offer you my thoughts on paper.

1. Launch Educational Program.

I think that with the deputies meeting Wednesday, our meeting on Thursday, and Don Smith's enthusiasm for this project this is well on track. The only dark cloud on the horizon: I sense that the deputies are supportive in the abstract but will resist when called upon to release some of their best people for a period of 16 weeks as students or, when asked, for members of the faculty. I would bet a lot on their coolness when this project nears fruition. That likely will take some strong action on your part in support of Don.

2. Improve Quality of Analytic Product.

I certainly agree with the inclusion of this goal but wonder if it is not defined too narrowly. You already have under way projects to emphasize greater policy orientation, including options and their pros and cons. Similarly, ever since the founding of the PIWG, there has been a greater effort at CIA to orient the product more towards the interests and needs of the policymaker and to be more active in determining what those needs and wants are. The goal of including more divergent views, more acknowledgment of uncertainties, and more probabilities is certainly a laudable one, and you have been working on all three of these for some time now.

I believe, however, that there is an equally deep-seated problem with analysis that requires high-level attention: we too often are the nation's highest paid collection of historians. We are very good at describing the past whether last night or six months ago, but we are weak when it comes to describing the future. Perhaps this gets back to your point of divergent views and acknowledgment of

uncertainties, but I believe it especially important for intelligence to focus its efforts more on the brief presentation of the factual base and then going ahead to give our view of what the future looks like. This must necessarily be speculative but it is in my view what we get paid for and certainly what policymakers look for. This really is the essence of successive Presidents' problems with our political intelligence. Their problem is not "political intelligence" per se but the question of intentions--and the prediction of intentions must necessarily be speculative. And we don't do nearly enough of it.

Another aspect that I believe needs high-level attention is analyst training--their background and skills and what is being done to improve these. Such remedies range from travel and overseas assignments to going back to school and so forth. To develop a corps of specialists requires much greater attention to this aspect of the problem.

Finally, another part of improving the quality of the analytic product is to place the Agency on the frontier of methodological developments. The Agency, as far as I can tell, runs years behind private think tanks like Rand in terms of the application of game theory and a variety of other methodological and quantitative techniques for analysis. I think steps need to be taken to ensure that we are in the forefront in this area.

In short, while I agree with ^{your} goal of improving the quality of analytic product during the remainder of the year (and also agree that all the things that I have set forth are impossible to pursue simultaneously by the end of this year), I would urge you to incorporate as a part of this goal producing more future-oriented, speculative analysis of alternative futures in various areas of the world. This in turn could be integrated very nicely and usefully into your third goal.

3. Prepare for New Look at Foreign Policy Under a New or Renewed Administration.

This almost need not be a goal because it will be something required of us by a new or renewed Administration. I think what you are proposing is that we get this kind of effort under way well before the elections so that we are positioned to respond to either a Reagan or Carter call for such a new look. With regard to your specific sub-goals, I think you are safe in pursuing the options analyses that you have already discussed with Zbig for a Carter Administration but would proceed much more cautiously with respect to a Reagan Administration. We can be prepared to go either way but should Reagan be elected I believe you should be very cautious about surfacing options analyses in the post-November period. On the other hand, the area reviews, as well as functional categories such as strategic programs and economics, offer you and the Agency an opportunity to "strut our stuff." Such area reviews should include the kind of future-oriented analysis I described under number 2 above and could provide an exciting opportunity for some genuinely creative analysis.

4. CIA Executive Development.

STAT If successor planning is the primary aspect of executive development you intend to pursue, I believe you need to be more specific with yourself in terms of just what that means. To what extent is "successor planning" the naming of individuals coming up through the line to take particular jobs, and to what extent is it laying the ground work for specialized training/education and accelerated career tracks? In other words, is your view of successor planning generic or is it person-specific? I think it should be both and it certainly is an appropriate goal. But you will need to set forth your objectives in this area especially both specifically and comprehensively to make any headway.

There is one other goal that I think there is time for you to pursue and which I still believe should have considerable priority: better preparing CIA and the Intelligence Community for crisis management. As described in [] and my paper to you, we can anticipate several years of more or less continuing crisis conditions as we move from one problem area to another. There is a need to improve Agency and Community capabilities to sustain a number of simultaneous task forces, to improve briefing capabilities, crisis management mechanisms, Agency command and control, Agency communications with the White House, and so forth. Because most of this involves internal work, your opportunity and power to effect fairly significant change and improvement is greater than in other areas. I suggest you give consideration to including this along with your other four goals.

Needless to say, we can talk about your outline and my comments further at your convenience.

Robert M. Gates

Attachment

DCI
30 June 1980

DCI GOALS (not in priority) - Remainder CY 1980

1. Launch educational program
2. Improve quality of analytic product
 - Greater policy orientation
 - Pros and cons of options
 - More divergent views
 - More acknowledgment of uncertainties
 - More probabilities
3. Prepare for new look at foreign policy under either a new or renewed administration
 - Options analyses
 - Area reviews
4. CIA Executive development
 - Successor planning